

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/PV.261
3 May 1966

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND SIXTY-FIRST MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 3 May 1966, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. A. ABERRA

(Ethiopia)

OF MICHIGAN

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. G. de CARVALHO SILOS

Mr. C.H. PAULINO PRATES

Bulgaria:

Mr. C. LUKANOV

Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV

Mr. D. POPOV

Mr. T. DAMIANOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. C. J. MARSHALL

Mr. P. D. LEE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. T. LAHODA

Mr. V. VAJNAR

Mr. V. CEBIS

Ethiopia:

Mr. A. ABERRA

Mr. A. ZELLEKE

Mr. B. ASSFAW

India:

Mr. V. C. TRIVEDI

Mr. K. P. LUKOSE

Mr. K. P. JAIN

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

Mr. G. P. TOZZOLI

Mr. S. AVETTA

Mr. F. SORO

Mexico:

Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO

Nigeria:

Mr. G. O. IJEWERE

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
Mr. B. KAJDY

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU
Mr. C. UNGUREANU
Mr. A. COROIANU

Sweden:

Mr. W. WACHTMEISTER
Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD
Mr. R. BOMAN
Mr. T. WULFF

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. A. ROSHCIN
Mr. O. A. GRINEVSKY
Mr. G. K. EFIMOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. H. KHALLAF
Mr. A. OSMAN
Mr. M. KASSEM
Mr. A. A. SALAM

United Kingdom:

Lord CHALFONT
Sir Harold BEELEY
Mr. J. G. TAHOURDIN
Miss E. J. M. RICHARDSON

United States of America:

Mr. W. C. FOSTER
Mr. S. DePALMA
Mr. D. S. MacDONALD
Mr. W. F. MILLER

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. O. FREY

The CHAIRMAN (Ethiopia): I declare open the two hundred and sixty-first plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. LUKANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from Russian): We are coming to the end of one stage of our work during the present year. Unfortunately, our work has not proved to be as fruitful as it might have been. No progress has been made in the question of general and complete disarmament or in the questions related to collateral measures aimed at the limitation of the arms race and the lessening of international tension. The Western delegations have rejected all attempts by individual delegations to find compromise solutions both in regard to questions of general and complete disarmament and in regard to certain collateral measures.

The decisions of the United States Government regarding another increase in armaments and a further extension of the war of aggression in Viet-Nam have taken the place of those political decisions in the field of disarmament which could have served as an incentive in the work of the Committee and which had been expected by the peoples, who demand peace and peaceful co-existence. A foreign policy of intervention, including armed intervention in the domestic affairs of other peoples, continues to predetermine the negative position of the United States and its allies in regard to a whole number of constructive proposals on the part of the socialist and non-aligned countries in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. This position of the Western delegations has had an unfavourable effect also on the discussion of one of the most urgent questions -- the drafting of a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons -- which has been entrusted to us by resolution 2028(XX) (ENDC/161) of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

The Bulgarian delegation has already explained its position on this question, and would like today to stress some further considerations regarding the principles which form the basic element of a treaty to curb the spread of nuclear weapons. We have already pointed out that the United States doctrine on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (ENDC/152/and Add.1) provides for only a limited, incomplete prohibition of the spread of nuclear weapons, because it ignores the prevention of cases of participation in the ownership, control and use of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

The position of the United States and its allies in regard to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, as set forth in the United States draft treaty and in the statements of Western representatives, amounts in fact to prohibiting the spread of these weapons only outside NATO, while at the same time retaining the possibility of spreading them within these alliances at the discretion of the United States. But this means -- no more and no less -- sanctioning by way of an international agreement an exclusive right for some nuclear Powers to do what they like with nuclear weapons, including spreading them before the eyes and with the approval of all the signatory States to the treaty.

The United States thesis regarding "national control", on which its draft treaty is based, involves in fact a dual limitation of the ban on the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The first limitation of the ban on proliferation comes from the introduction of the term "national" into the draft. The use of this term excludes from the scope of the treaty precisely military alliances composed of States possessing nuclear weapons and States not possessing them. This is further confirmed by the words "association of non-nuclear weapon States" (ENDC/152/Add.1), which have been introduced as an amendment to the United States draft treaty. The laying down of a ban on the transfer of nuclear weapons to such associations is intended to shield military alliances of a different type: alliances of nuclear and non-nuclear Powers, as all Western alliances are, and to place them outside the scope of the treaty.

The second limitation of the ban on the spread of nuclear weapons derives from the definition of the concept of "control" given in the amended article IV (c) of the United States text:

"... right or ability to fire nuclear weapons without the concurrent decision of an existing nuclear-weapon State." (ibid.)

As has already been pointed out by the delegations of the socialist countries, this definition in fact limits the ban only to the firing of nuclear weapons, and does not prevent physical access to them or their use in general. In practice it means that non-nuclear Powers would be able, within the framework of nuclear military alliances, to participate in the joint ownership and control of nuclear weapons. It was precisely of such control of the nuclear might of NATO by its non-nuclear members that Mr. Dean Rusk, the United States Secretary of State, spoke on 27 April (ENDC/PV.260, pp. 11-12). The only limitation would be on the non-nuclear members' right or ability to fire these weapons.

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

The socialist countries have repeatedly pointed out the contradiction between the United States draft treaty and the first principle laid down in resolution 2028(XX). We shall therefore not at present dwell any further on that question. It is beyond dispute. We shall touch briefly on principle 2 (b), which reads "The treaty should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers". The representatives of the non-aligned countries in the Committee have given great attention to this principle and developed its various aspects. One of its most important aspects is that of guaranteeing the security of non-nuclear Powers against the use of nuclear weapons and also against the threat of the use of such weapons. I shall recall a few statements made on this subject at meetings of the Committee. On 22 February the representative of Mexico, Ambassador Gomez Robledo, said:

"... this question of balance is identical with ... the other question of the so-called guarantees which the non-nuclear Powers must unquestionably receive if they are to take such a serious step as that of limiting their sovereignty and restricting their security." (ENDC/PV.242, p.6)

The representative of Nigeria, speaking on the same subject, said:

"An indispensable element in any non-proliferation measure is, therefore, a firm undertaking with adequate guarantees by the nuclear Powers not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear Powers under any circumstances whatever, or to threaten to use them". (ENDC/PV.235, p.31)

Our delegation considers that the question of security guarantees for Powers not possessing nuclear weapons is an important one and merits serious attention. We share the opinion expressed by many delegations that in order to solve this question correctly it is essential that States possessing nuclear weapons should assume an important obligation: not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States parties to the treaty which have no nuclear weapons in their territory, as proposed in the Message dated 1 February 1966 from the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. Kosygin, to this Committee (ENDC/167, p.3).

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

A second important condition for ensuring the security of States not possessing nuclear weapons is to preclude all possibilities for any State other than the existing nuclear States to obtain access to nuclear weapons. Thus Premier Kosygin's proposal, together with the closing of all loop-holes for proliferation as provided for in the Soviet draft treaty (ENDC/164), gives an adequate guarantee for the non-nuclear Powers and is fully in keeping with the requirements of the basic principles of resolution 2028 (XX).

Unfortunately, even after the clarifications that have been made we do not find in the United States draft treaty any obligation on the part of States possessing nuclear weapons that would provide adequate guarantees for the security of the non-nuclear signatory States to the treaty against a possible nuclear threat. In the United States draft treaty there is no mention of renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons or of the threat of their use against States not possessing these weapons. In these circumstances it is quite clear that the United States draft treaty does not provide the necessary guarantees for States not possessing nuclear weapons, and consequently does not take into account the principle contained in paragraph 2(b) of United Nations resolution 2028 (XX).

At the beginning of this session the United States put forward as a guarantee the unilateral statement of President Johnson that --

"... the nations that do not seek the nuclear path can be sure that they will have our strong support against threats of nuclear blackmail"

(ENDC/165, p.2).

The inacceptability of that sort of "guarantee" has been pointed out by most of the delegations in the Committee. It is obvious that for the non-aligned countries the acceptance of such a "guarantee" would mean betraying the basic principle of their foreign policy -- non-alignment where blocs and alliances are concerned. To the socialist countries such a "guarantee" is a sheer absurdity. The statement of the President of the United States of America cannot fulfil the role of a guarantee in an international treaty, which must provide for multilateral guarantees.

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

We have recalled President Johnson's unilateral statement not at all in order to seek an occasion for polemics but only because, in comparing it with the idea of a "veto", we find a common element. As is well known, the United States introduced into the amended text of its draft treaty the concept of a "veto" which, in the opinion of the Western countries, should serve as a guarantee both against the proliferation of nuclear weapons and for the security of States.

The common element which we find in these two ideas is that the United States sees its role in solving the problem of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, not as the role of any other member of the international community and of a party to a multilateral international treaty which imposes equal obligations on all nuclear Powers, but as the role of leader of the world community. By introducing the idea of a "veto" into the treaty, the United States seeks in fact to keep its hands free to proliferate nuclear weapons to the extent that suits its interests, and thus to place itself in an exclusive position in relation to all the other Powers parties to the treaty. It is easy to understand, however, that it is impossible on such a basis to achieve any progress, in regard not only to the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons but also to any other disarmament question.

The delegations of the socialist and non-aligned countries have repeatedly stressed during this session that a treaty on non-proliferation should not be an aim in itself, but a step forward within a range of measures leading to nuclear disarmament. The accomplishment of a measure such as prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons should facilitate, not make more difficult, the achievement of agreement on other measures within this range. By closing all channels for the spread of nuclear weapons the Soviet draft treaty goes precisely in this direction, whereas the United States of America and its allies are more concerned that the non-proliferation treaty should not set up a definite and insurmountable obstacle to access to nuclear weapons by the Federal Republic of Germany. It is easy to understand that access in any form whatever to nuclear weapons by any new Powers -- and that is what acceptance of the United States draft treaty would inevitably lead to -- would not only mean not taking a step towards nuclear disarmament, but would also complicate and render extremely difficult any further negotiations on this question.

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

The Western delegations have made many efforts to convince us that there is nothing to fear if other States besides the existing nuclear States are given access to nuclear weapons within the framework of military alliances, and that it does not matter who possesses nuclear weapons; the important thing is who will have the right to fire them — that is what our Western colleagues are trying to make us believe. In their opinion it would make no difference if even the Federal Republic of Germany were to participate in the possession or control of nuclear weapons, since the decision on the use of such weapons would depend, as hitherto, on the will of the nuclear allies of the Federal Republic.

This was the meaning of the statement made by the representative of the United Kingdom, Lord Chalfont, on 22 March when he said:

"But a nuclear weapon — forgive me if I state the obvious — is no danger to anyone unless it can be fired; and to fire it you must have control of it." (ENDC/PV.250, p.16).

In a similar vein the representative of Italy, Mr. Tozzoli, tried to convince us on 5 April that, in drafting a treaty on non-proliferation, the Committee should also take into account "the power to relinquish national sovereignty freely to a wider supranational community". (ENDC/PV.255, p.27)

We agree that it falls within the domestic competence of the States concerned to decide whether or not to relinquish their sovereign rights; but was it necessary to introduce into our debates such elements as, for example, the discussion of the theoretical possibility of transforming a nuclear State into an alliance or association of nuclear or non-nuclear States at a time when there is an absolutely real and immediate danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons? The answer to this question was given by the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Roshchin, at the 255th and 260th meetings. On 5 April he said:

"This element is being introduced into our discussion for the purpose of creating some sort of additional legal basis to justify the idea of the proliferation of nuclear weapons within the framework of military alliances to which nuclear Powers are parties". (ibid., p.21)

After everything we have said, it is not surprising that the Western Powers are unwilling to conclude a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which would close all loop-holes. If the Western Powers really wish for success in this field,

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they must reconsider their position so as to do away with those elements which do not accord with resolution 2028 (XX) of the United Nations General Assembly and prevent progress in our negotiations.

But does it require a great deal of effort by the Western Powers to achieve an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons? No, not at all. All that is required is that two of the States represented here, the United States and the United Kingdom, should show more respect for their own signatures and stop deleting in practice the most fundamental provisions of the Potsdam Agreements of 1945. The Potsdam Agreements lay down unequivocally the obligations of Germany in the field of armaments, including nuclear weapons, and thus prohibit any access by the Federal Republic of Germany to nuclear weapons in any form whatever -- whether in the form of physical access through a multilateral force of any kind, or in the form of political access through the McNamara Committee and the like. Let this provision of the Potsdam Agreements be carried out, and a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons will become a fact.

We hope that, after the resumption of the work of the Committee in June, it will be possible to set about the practical task of drafting a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which is awaited with impatience by all peace-loving people, who see in it an important step towards eliminating the danger of a thermonuclear war.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): As the Committee is nearing the end of its seventh session, I think the time has come to take stock very briefly of what we have accomplished during this period and to try to envisage the prospects for our future work.

The Committee has discussed all the subjects on its agenda -- general and complete disarmament and collateral measures -- and has devoted special attention to the agreement on non-proliferation and to the banning of tests. On all these matters the exchange of views has been serious and without any doubt useful. The discussions on general and complete disarmament, despite the lack of progress in drafting a treaty, have confirmed one important fact: the constant and unanimous conviction that general and complete disarmament is a necessity and remains the

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essential task of this Committee. These facts in themselves have considerable political significance and show us that the desire for mutual understanding and the hope for a new world prevail over all the crises and over all the present anxieties.

As for collateral measures, the discussions during this session have led to new and interesting clarifications concerning the United States proposals. Thus, in regard to the "cut-off" and the reconversion of military fissionable material, the Committee has at its disposal certain texts, certain basic drafts, which would constitute a concrete and, so to speak, ready-made basis for an agreement. This extensive and thorough elaboration of the United States proposals contrasts with that of the Soviet proposals, which are rather sketchy. But I must have expressed myself badly if the Soviet delegation could believe, as I thought it did when I was listening to Mr. Roshchin at our meeting on 21 April (ENDC/PV.258, pp.9 et seq.), that that was the main reason for the Italian delegation's objections to the Soviet proposals.

In reality it is rather their character, sometimes insufficient, sometimes unbalanced, sometimes unverified, that gives rise to our objections. I do not want to go into details now, but let us take, for example, the proposal for a non-aggression pact (ENDC/77). In principle we are bound to be in favour of anything that would tend to increase mutual confidence. But would a non-aggression pact really answer that purpose? The present threat to peace lies not so much in direct aggression, for which the aggressor would pay very dearly, as in insidious acts and subversion. Would non-aggression pacts give us guarantees against that sort of danger? Could we have confidence in such agreements when we have once again heard here a reaffirmation of the ideology of national wars of liberation which takes priority over any other consideration? What value can be placed on agreements which, on the Soviet side, would always be subordinated to that dangerous ideology?

The Eastern delegations have also put forward again the Polish proposal for a denuclearized zone in Europe (ENDC/C.1/1). My delegation has great respect for the intentions which seem to lie at the origin of this proposal. However, does not this proposal overlook an important fact: that the massive deployments of nuclear devices are not found in Western Europe but indeed in an almost adjacent

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territory which would remain outside any agreements on denuclearization or a freeze? Nevertheless, the Gomulka proposal (ENDC/PV.189, p.6) has some interesting aspects. For the first time the Eastern side recognizes the importance of freeze measures and that the freeze must be controlled. That, in our opinion, is an important point logically and leads me to reaffirm that in the present circumstances it is only by taking certain controlled freeze measures as a point of departure that the arms race can be halted.

I hope that during our next session the Soviet delegation will be so good as to tell us in which specific field of arms production it would be able to envisage a freeze; I hope that it will thus be possible to start in a concrete manner the dialogue concerning a halt in arms production in several sectors, or at any rate in one sector, in order to achieve a first agreement on the limitation of the arms race as a starting-point for more extensive and more binding measures.

The prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests, which is also a freeze measure, has been amply discussed during this session. On this subject we have heard quite new and interesting proposals put forward by the delegation of Mexico (ENDC/PV.246, pp. 6 et seq.), and the delegation of the United Arab Republic (ENDC/PV.259, pp.24 et seq.). We must be grateful to these delegations which, in a field already thoroughly ploughed over, have yet been able to find new ideas. We pay tribute to their sagacity.

Another contribution to the solution of the problem of tests came from another non-aligned country -- from the Government of Sweden (ENDC/154). That Government, as we know, has convened a meeting of technicians from various countries to study the problem of detection and identification -- a problem of crucial importance for an agreement on prohibition. The interest which the delegations of the Soviet Union and certain Eastern countries appear to take in the Swedish initiative causes us to hope that the Eastern delegations' opposition in principle to any joint technical studies has lessened. This favourable evolution of the Soviet attitude, if it were confirmed, could open the way to very constructive work during our next session, aimed at solving at last, with the aid of scientific progress, the crucial problem of inspection. Everyone realizes that, if that were possible, the solution of a fundamental problem, of another freeze problem, that of non-proliferation, would be greatly facilitated.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

It is on this question that the Committee has concentrated its efforts during this session, but unfortunately without yet overcoming the difficulties. On this question the Soviet delegation, in its statement of 28 April (ENDC/PV.260, pp.6 et seq.), recapitulated its arguments against the United States draft treaty (ENDC/152 and Add.1), attacking it particularly on two fronts: the alleged possibility of transforming a nuclear Power into an association of Powers having control over nuclear weapons, and the right of veto of the nuclear Powers.

In regard to the first point, I think there is some confusion which should be cleared up. Nothing in the text of the United States draft could lead to the developments to which the Soviet delegation has referred. Indeed, if associations having collective control over nuclear weapons existed, they would come under the heading of "independent centres" and would consequently be prohibited in accordance with article IV(c).

As for the Soviet criticisms regarding the right of veto, it seemed to me surprising, to say the least, that precisely what is designed to achieve the essential aim of non-proliferation, namely the provision prohibiting the creation of any new centre for the use of nuclear weapons, should be condemned. But I think it is too late to widen the explanatory exchanges of opinion during this session. On the contrary, we must prepare good foundations for the resumption of our work, so that it may be really effective in the future and lead us speedily to positive conclusions.

At the beginning of this session I suggested (ENDC/PV.236, p.8) that we proceed to a careful comparative examination of the two draft treaties. Unfortunately the Soviet delegation -- which in the beginning had itself proposed this work -- changed its mind. It seemed to want to avoid this, and refused also to clarify certain points in its draft treaty. If that work of comparison had been carried out with goodwill on both sides, I believe we should have made some progress and should have arrived at some agreed, or at least partially agreed, preliminary texts.

The Soviet delegation seemed to think that it would be useless to discuss minor questions as long as there was no agreement on essentials. I venture to have a different opinion on this point, and I wonder whether a careful comparative examination of the two texts would not have revealed -- even for the part which the Soviet delegation considers essential -- divergences less serious than would appear at

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first sight. I once tried to engage in a thorough comparison of the two texts, but the Soviet delegation did not wish to follow this course; the spirit of its statements -- at times polemical -- unfortunately created confusion and obscurity. This has contributed to making the respective positions appear further apart than they probably would be in the light of a comparative study of the two texts.

As far as I am concerned, I insist on saying that this careful and thorough comparison should be carried out during our next session. We have some time before us for reflection, and I hope the Soviet delegation will become convinced of the usefulness of making a thorough comparison of the texts and improving our working methods. I also hope that the Soviet delegation will respond to the efforts at understanding already made by the Western delegations by in its turn amending its draft treaty.

It was in order to take into account the recommendations of the United Nations, the Soviet draft and the comments of other delegations that the United States delegation, in agreement with the other Western delegations, endeavoured to amend its text by borrowing in part the language of the Soviet draft treaty. Nothing like that has been done by the Soviet delegation, whose draft has undergone no change since last October. It is to be hoped that, either in order to comply with the United Nations resolution, which recommends the application of safeguards -- so far completely ignored in the Soviet text -- , or in order to take into account the comments of other delegations, the Soviet delegation will in its turn reconsider its position and draft some new proposals likely to bring the two sides closer together.

The Western delegations, which have already given many proofs of goodwill, will always show flexibility and will always be ready to listen to any proposals. They will go very far in their efforts at conciliation; but naturally they would not be able to accept the idea that non-dissemination should be envisaged as a measure that concerns only one sector of the world, or that, taken as an occasion for unjustified attacks against a friendly country, it should become a pretext for attempting to undermine the defensive and integrated co-operation of the Atlantic Alliance.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

Before concluding, I should like to make a final comment. We recently heard it stated that the work of our Committee could not advance one inch on account of the general political situation. This statement is not in conformity with other more encouraging statements which we heard at the beginning of this session. Nor is it in conformity with the positive and hopeful words which we have often heard from the Soviet and other Eastern delegations.

It is these latter words that I wish to believe; it is on these latter affirmations that I wish to concentrate my attention; for, in our opinion, it is precisely through the constant efforts of this Committee, through the achievement of some agreements here, that we can hope to bring about a diminution of world tension and an improvement in mutual confidence everywhere, thereby facilitating indirectly a negotiated and peaceful solution of the present crisis. In our opinion this Committee must be a constant link between the East and West, through which, with the co-operation of the non-aligned countries, endeavours are being made to work patiently and practically to halt the arms race, which in itself is also a further and dangerous factor in promoting tension and mistrust.

The Italian delegation intends of course, during the suspension of our work, to study everything which, while preserving the essential principle of security, would be likely to facilitate agreements and finally bring the various points of view on all problems, and especially on non-proliferation, closer together. As all know, the Italian Government sets particular store by an agreement on this matter, so much so that last year it took the initiative of submitting the idea of a controlled unilateral moratorium (ENDC/157). Italy still hopes that the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty in the coming months will render superfluous other initiatives which, though certainly very useful and reasonable, would only provide an incomplete solution to this problem.

Mr. TRIVEDI (India): Mr. Chairman, with your permission and with the indulgence of the members of the Committee, I should like to speak this morning on the question of general and complete disarmament.

As we are all aware, our Committee has been constituted, to quote General Assembly resolution 1722 (XVI), to undertake negotiations "with a view to reaching ... agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control" (A/RES/1722 (XVI), part II, para. 2; ENDC/139) as a matter of utmost urgency. It is perhaps a little too harsh, and admittedly somewhat exaggerated, to say that we have been straying away from our terms of reference; but the fact remains that we have not been devoting adequate time to the main task before us. When the reports of our Committee came up for discussion during the last session of the General Assembly, that august body asked us to continue our "efforts towards making substantial progress in reaching agreement on the question of general and complete disarmament" (A/RES/2031 (XX), para. 1; ENDC/161). The Indian delegation believes that the only way to make progress on this question is to devote adequate time and effort to discussions and debates on it.

It is necessary to remind ourselves that ours is not an Eighteen-Nation Committee on arms control and arms limitation but a Committee on Disarmament; that we have been specifically constituted to negotiate a treaty on general and complete disarmament; and that the General Assembly of the United Nations has been asking us every year to resume our negotiations on general and complete disarmament with energy and determination.

When the Committee met last year, it hardly touched upon the problem of general and complete disarmament. This year we are now about to go into recess, and so far we have only skirted around the subject at a few meetings. It is essential for us to examine, therefore, whether it is not appropriate that we revert to our traditional programme of work and devote one day a week to the question of general and complete disarmament when we resume our meeting in the middle of June.

The Indian delegation is aware that there are also some collateral issues before us, and that these issues require urgent attention. The problems of the continuing proliferation of nuclear weapons with its attendant and consequent risks, the incompleteness of the partial nuclear test-ban Treaty (ENDC.100/Rev.1), both in its adherence and in the extent of its prohibitory provisions, and the various proposals for reduction of international tension and building of mutual confidence -- these are unquestionably important issues deserving continued negotiations.

(Mr. Trivedi, India)

At the same time, as we said on 15 February, we should be careful that we do not "miss the wood for the trees" (ENDC/PV.240, p.6). It is necessary to remind ourselves continually not to lose sight of our real objective, the objective of general and complete disarmament, and to ensure that we do not convert ourselves into a mere sub-committee discussing one or two specific and limited measures of arms control. We should by all means deal with the urgent problems of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and cessation of all nuclear weapon tests, and conduct our negotiations on them with energy, determination, urgency and continuity. As the Indian delegation sees it, there is no doubt in the mind of any one of us on the need to continue our discussions on these issues.

It is equally essential, however, to ensure that we also negotiate on the main task which forms the raison d'être of the Committee and the precise terms of reference of the Committee as laid down by the international community -- namely, agreement on general and complete disarmament. As our Foreign Secretary said on 5 April:

"... we must never forget that the tasks of this Committee are very wide ... There can be no other goal but that of general and complete disarmament, to which the United Nations and the whole of humanity is committed ... That goal should never be lost sight of". (ENDC/PV.255, p.6)

I should like to emphasize the thought in this statement that this is a goal to which the whole of humanity is now committed. The evolution in man's thinking on the questions of peace and security, which led finally to the formulation of the goal of general and complete disarmament, is one of the most hopeful features of modern civilization. It has been a slow evolution, but it has been sure and unmistakable. In the centuries of the past, the emphasis was on arms control and limitation, on reduction of armaments and, on some occasions, on controlling the activities of other nations.

To be sure, there were philosophers and statesmen even in the dim past who talked of complete abolition of all arms and of total repudiation of the use of force. In our own country there was an emperor, Ashoka, who ruled a vast empire in the third century B.C. He waged a short and sanguinary war against the Kalingas in Eastern India and was afflicted by repentance as the war involved death, destruction and unhappiness. He revealed himself a philosopher in the consequences he drew from

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his remorse, and expressed his philosophy in proclamations and laws inscribed on rock edicts throughout his empire. Although Ashoka died centuries ago, his edicts have survived. One of these, which scholars describe as Rock Edict XIII, sets forth Ashoka's philosophy of peace and morality as follows:

"The Kalinga country was conquered by King Priyadarshi, beloved of the Gods, in the eighth year of his reign. One hundred and fifty thousand persons were carried away captive, one hundred thousand were slain and many times that number died ... The beloved of the Gods, conqueror of the Kalingas, is moved to remorse now. For he has felt profound sorrow and regret because the conquest of a people involves slaughter, death and deportation.

But there is a more important reason for the King's remorse ... Even those who escaped calamity themselves are deeply afflicted by the misfortunes suffered by their friends, acquaintances, companions and relatives ... Thus all men share in the misfortune, and this weighs on King Priyadarshi's mind ... Even if the number of people who were killed or who died or who were carried away in the Kalinga war had been only one-hundredth or one-thousandth of what it actually was, this would still have weighed on the King's mind ... King Priyadarshi considers moral conquest, that is conquest by Dharma, the most important conquest ... This edict on Dharma has been inscribed so that my sons and grandsons, who may come after me, should not think new conquests worth achieving ... Let them consider moral conquest the only true conquest ...".

There were other philosophers and statesmen in other lands who also put forward over the centuries this basic philosophy of international and inter-human relations. Despite these precepts and practices, however, the society of nations as a whole did not until very recently accept fully that the only hope of survival of our civilization and of progress lay in general and complete disarmament.

In the past there have been treaties of arms control and limitation, of qualitative and quantitative disarmament, and of special prohibitions placed on defeated nations by the victors. It is pertinent to observe, however, that even in these fields the approach was to stipulate that the obligations and responsibilities, limited or partial, would apply equally to all countries concerned. As early as the 18th and 19th centuries there was growing realization among the nations of Europe that the balance of power could be maintained not only by frustrating the growth of the opponent's strength but also by restraining as a matter of policy the growth of one's own strength. Even the imposition of a discriminatory treaty like the Treaty

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of Versailles had a dual purpose: first, "to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations" and secondly, to render it impossible for Germany to resume her policy of military aggression. Lord Cecil, who made qualitative disarmament the dominant issue in the League Conference of 1932, specifically urged that the chief task of the Conference was the prohibition of all nations of those kinds of armaments which are forbidden to the vanquished Powers. That Conference demonstrated, however, that it was not easy to impose discriminatory restrictions on some countries in the first instance and then hope to negotiate corresponding obligations and responsibilities on the rest.

At this stage I do not wish to go into the question of these past pitfalls or of the inadequacies of past procedures. What I wish to emphasize is that until very recently the efforts of the international community were directed towards measures of arms control and limitation and not towards total and universal disarmament. Even the Charter of the United Nations, which was drafted before the world was made aware of the transcendent terror of the nuclear weapon, talks of the use of armed force in the common interest, of the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments, and of "possible disarmament" (Article 47). The early resolutions of the United Nations referred to general regulation and reduction of armaments to be observed by all participants and not only by some of the participants; nevertheless the General Assembly was then concerned with the regulation and reduction of armaments and not with total disarmament.

It was not until 20 November 1959, at the fourteenth session and the 840th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, that United Nations resolution 1378 (XIV) adopted the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control as the goal of the international community. Resolution 1378 (XIV) considered that the question of general and complete disarmament was the most important one facing the world. Since then the United Nations has reiterated this fundamental truth repeatedly. The international community has firmly and unequivocally set this goal before itself and has entrusted to our Committee the task of negotiating a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

It is imperative, therefore, that we do not lose sight either of the immutable essentiality of this objective, or of the views of the international community on the subject, or of the raison d'être of our Committee. Let us by all means discuss various limited or collateral problems; but we must continue to negotiate a treaty on

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general and complete disarmament and, above all, we must ensure that in all our discussions on any problem, general or specific, we bear in mind the requirements of the ultimate goal. Non-dissemination of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the banning of all nuclear weapon tests in all environments and other measures have thus to be conceived as forming an integral part of our basic objective. They have all to be conceived in the general and harmonious framework of disarmament. Unless we do this we are apt to develop a basic disequilibrium of approach which at best tends to treat a particular measure as an end in itself and at worst militates against the basic principle of balance and universal security.

The Indian delegation therefore notes with gratification that the draft outline of a treaty on general and complete disarmament submitted by the United States of America (ENDC/30 and Corr. 1 and Add. 1, 2 and 3) and the draft treaty submitted by the USSR (ENDC/2/Rev.1 and Add.1) include measures like non-proliferation within the framework of comprehensive disarmament. This is not to say, of course, that the partial measures of disarmament should not be discussed separately and collaterally or that they should not be accorded priority; but it does mean that those measures must be clearly conceived of as measures of disarmament and not as isolated or preliminary limitations to be imposed on some small countries.

It has been argued that in the past the Committee did devote some time to the question of general and complete disarmament, but an impasse was reached on the problem of the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles. The Indian delegation recognizes this, but is convinced that the Committee's response to it should not be to stop or postpone its discussions on the subject. Disarmament is not a process or a situation which can be achieved overnight or even within a short time. It is a matter which vitally affects the security interests of all nations, and obviously it will not be easy to reach agreements. Moreover, general and complete disarmament and the prospect of a completely disarmed world is a relatively new concept. The human society has never been disarmed in the past; our endeavour is therefore unprecedented. All this makes it abundantly necessary that we continue to negotiate and attempt to solve the difficulties which we encounter. It is true that we have been meeting here for over four years, but that is not too long in relation either to human history or to the importance of the supremely vital objective that we have before us.

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It appears to the Indian delegation that there are four principal reasons why we should resume our regular discussions on general and complete disarmament. First, of course, that is our main task. Our Committee was formed precisely to undertake these discussions. Secondly, it is only the discussion on general and complete disarmament which will give us the correct perspective for all our discussions, whether we are talking of the bomber bonfire or nuclear-free zones, of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons or controlling the use of nuclear energy. Without this perspective we are apt to lose our way and stray into perilous paths which even the balance-of-power-oriented potentates of the past rejected as early as the 18th century. Thirdly, it is only through debate and discussion, through negotiation and exchange of views, however fruitless and frustrating they may appear momentarily, that we can hope to resolve the outstanding differences.

Lastly, our negotiating body of eighteen has one unquestionable advantage, and that is the presence of the eight non-aligned delegations. Scholars and statesmen who have thought about disarmament and felt deeply about it have pointed out that there are three elements which provide the justification for disarmament and for the goal of a disarmed society. These are moral, economic and security factors. On all those grounds the non-aligned nations, which are at the same time developing nations and in general militarily weak nations, have a greater stake in disarmament.

The non-aligned nations have accordingly attempted to make their contributions to the task of the Committee in as constructive a manner as possible. Their views may not have always found favour with the super-Powers and their allies. That is understandable; for, after all, disarmament affects the vital security interests of all nations and the super-Powers have to exercise particular care in that behalf, as they have to dismantle a vast, complex and far-reaching military apparatus. At the same time, a fresh approach, one not based on alliance interests, can sometimes help the super-Powers themselves as well as the international community as a whole.

Our Committee thus provides an ideal forum for proceeding with our efforts towards making substantial progress in reaching agreement on the question of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The Indian delegation was happy to note that the Soviet and the United States delegations gave in their last interventions comprehensive expositions of their points of view, bringing the Committee up to date, as it were, on the question of general and complete

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disarmament and on the specific issue on which disagreement had developed when we postponed our substantive negotiations on the subject over eighteen months ago.

It has been generally recognized that the most complex and at the same time the most vital problem concerning general and complete disarmament is that of nuclear disarmament, and that the crux of this problem is the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles. India drew the attention of the world community to the urgency of dealing with this issue as early as 1957, when in its proposals to the United Nations Disarmament Commission it suggested that there should be an early elimination of the carriers of nuclear weapons. India emphasized that it was simpler to deal with carriers than with nuclear weapons, and that if the delivery vehicles were eliminated the nuclear weapons' capacity for harm would be greatly reduced. Subsequently, in 1959, the French Government made the suggestion through Mr. Jules Moch (A/C.1/SR.1030, paras. 16 et seq.) that carriers be eliminated in sea and air, including submarines and intercontinental ballistic missiles. The Soviet Union adopted this basic approach in its draft treaty on general and complete disarmament (ENDC/2/Rev.1).

In March 1964, therefore, the Indian delegation (ENDC/PV.177, pp.27 et seq.) commended for acceptance the thesis underlying the Gromyko proposal (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1) in relation to elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles. That was the thesis that India had long propounded, for India has always believed that disarmament has to be on a large and comprehensive scale and that the first stage of disarmament has to be substantial and impressive. As we said in March 1964, however, this need not mean the abandonment for ever of any other thesis, which may be revived at a later stage if this particular thesis is found wanting.

I do not propose to go into further details during this intervention, -- regarding, for example, the need for unbroken continuity in the process of disarmament and its conclusion within a reasonably short and definite period, or the organic relationship between nuclear and conventional disarmament. I hope that when we reconvene after the recess we shall resume the thread of our discussion where we left it eighteen months ago and deal with these and other issues. What I wish to put before the Committee principally is the conviction of the Indian delegation that we must devote increasing and regular attention to the question of general and complete disarmament. Let us not be daunted by differences, for despite these differences there is so much in common among us. The real danger lies, not in discussing differences and difficulties, but in avoiding such discussion and in resorting to inadequate remedies.

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Before I conclude, I should like to quote what the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, said in another context.

"When we recall our United Nations assignment it is evident that we have no right to work solely on one possibility, the prospect of concluding a non-proliferation agreement." (ENDC/PV.256, p.9).

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 261st plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador A. Aberra, representative of Ethiopia.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Bulgaria, Italy and India.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 5 May 1966, at 10 a.m."

The meeting rost at 11.55 a.m.

